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ABSTRACT
This paper reconsiders the Phelps-Lucas hypothesis, according to which temporary real effects
of purely nominal disturbances result from imperfect information, but departs from the assumptions of
Lucas (1973) in two crucial respects. Due to monopolistically competitive pricing, higher-order
expectations are crucial for aggregate inflation dynamics, as argued by Phelps  (1983).  And
decisionmakers' subjective perceptions of current conditions are assumed to be of imperfect precision,
owing to finite information processing capacity, as argued by Sims (2001).  The model can explain highly







woodford@princeton.edu1 Imperfect Information and Price Adjustment
A perennial question in macroeconomic theory is the reason for the observed real eﬀects
of changes in monetary policy. It is not too hard to understand why central-bank actions
can aﬀect the volume of nominal spending in an economy. But why should not variations in
nominal expenditure of this sort, not associated with any change in real factors such as tastes
or technology, simply result in proportional variation in nominal wages and prices, without
any eﬀect upon the quantities produced or consumed of anything? It has long been observed
that wages and prices do not immediately adjust to any extent close to full proportionality
with short-run variations in nominal expenditure, but again, why should not self-interested
households and ﬁrms act in a way that brings about more rapid adjustment?
A famous answer to this question is that people are not well enough informed about
changes in market conditions, at least at the time that these changes occur, to be able
immediately to react in the way that would most fully serve their own interests. Phelps (1970)
proposed the parable of an economy in which goods are produced on separate “islands,” each
with its own labor market; the parties determining wages and employment on an individual
island do so without being able to observe either the wages or production decisions on other
islands. As a result of this informational isolation, an increase in nominal expenditure on the
goods produced on all of the islands could be mis-interpreted on each island as an increase
in the relative demand for the particular good produced there, as a result of which wages
would not rise enough to prevent an increase in employment and output across all of the
islands. Lucas (1972) showed that such an argument for a short-term Phillips-curve tradeoﬀ
is consistent with “rational expectations” on each island, i.e., with expectations given by
Bayesian updating conditional upon the market conditions observed on that island, starting
from a prior that coincides with the objective ex ante probabilities (according to the model)
of diﬀerent states occurring.
This model of business ﬂuctuations was, for a time, hugely inﬂuential, and allowed the
development of a number of important insights into the consequences for economic policy
1of endogenizing the expectations on the basis of which wages and prices are determined.
However, the practical relevance of the imperfect-information model was soon subjected
to powerful criticism. In the Lucas model, equilibrium output diﬀers from potential only
insofar as the average estimate of current aggregate nominal expenditure diﬀers from the
actual value. In terms of the log-linear approximate model introduced in Lucas (1973) and
employed extensively in applied work thereafter, one can write
yt = ®(qt ¡ qtjt); (1.1)
where 0 < ® < 1 is a coeﬃcient depending upon the price-sensitivity of the supply of an
individual good. Here yt denotes the deviation of aggregate (log) real GDP from potential,
qt denotes aggregate nominal GDP, and qtjt the average (across islands) of the expected value
of qt conditional upon information available on that island in period t.
Furthermore, all aggregate disturbances in period t — and hence the volume of aggregate
nominal expenditure qt — become public information (observable on all islands) by date t+1.
This implies that
Et[qt+1jt+1(i)] = Et[qt+1]
in the case of each island i, where Et[¢] denotes an expectation conditional upon the history
of aggregate disturbances through date t, and qt+1jt+1(i) the expectation of qt+1 conditional
upon the information available on island i in period t + 1. Averaging over i, it follows that
Et[qt+1jt+1] = Et[qt+1]:
Then, taking the expectation of both sides of (1.1) for period t + 1 conditional upon the
history of aggregate disturbances through date t, it follows that
Et[yt+1] = 0: (1.2)
Equation (1.2) implies that deviations of output from potential cannot be forecasted a
period earlier by someone aware of the history of aggregate disturbances up to that time.
This means that a monetary disturbance in period t or earlier cannot have any eﬀect upon












Figure 1: Estimated impulse response of nominal GDP to an unexpected interest-rate
reduction. Source: Christiano et al. (2001).
equilibrium output in period t + 1 or later. But if follows that such real eﬀects of monetary
disturbances as are allowed for by (1.1) must be highly transitory: they must be present only
in the period in which the shock occurs. The model was accordingly criticized as unable to
account for the observed persistence of business ﬂuctuations.
Of course, the degree to which the prediction of eﬀects that last “one period” only is an
empirical embarrassment depends upon how long a “period” is taken to be. In the context
of the model, the critical signiﬁcance of a “period” is the length of time it takes for an
aggregate disturbance to become public information. But, many critics argued, the value of
the current money supply is published quite quickly, within a few weeks; thus real eﬀects of
variations in the money supply should last, according to the theory, for at most a few weeks.
Yet statistical analyses of the eﬀects of monetary disturbances indicated eﬀects lasting for
many quarters.
3Furthermore, the theory implied that monetary disturbances should not have even transi-
tory eﬀects on real activity, except insofar as these resulted in variations in aggregate nominal
expenditure that could not be forecasted on the basis of variables that were already public
information at the time of the eﬀect on spending. But the VAR literature of the early 1980s
(e.g., Sims, 1980) showed that variations in the growth rates of monetary aggregates were
largely forecastable in advance by nominal interest-rate innovations, and that the monetary
disturbances identiﬁed by these interest-rate surprises had no noticeable eﬀect upon nominal
expenditure for at least the ﬁrst six months. This has been conﬁrmed by many subsequent
studies; for example, Figure 1 shows the impulse response of nominal GDP to an unex-
pected loosening of monetary policy in quarter zero, according to the identiﬁed VAR model
of Christiano et al. (2001). (Here the periods on the horizontal axis represent quarters, and
the dashed lines indicate the +/- 2 s.e. conﬁdence interval for the response.) Although the
federal funds rate falls sharply in quarter zero (see their paper), there is no appreciable eﬀect
upon nominal GDP until two quarters later.
Thus given the estimated eﬀects of monetary disturbances upon nominal spending —
and given the fact that money-market interest rates are widely reported within a day — the
Lucas model would predict that there should be no eﬀect of such disturbances upon real
activity at all, whether immediate or delayed. Instead, the same study ﬁnds a substantial
eﬀect on real GDP, as shown in Figure 2. Furthermore, the real eﬀects persist for many
quarters: the peak eﬀect occurs only six quarters after the shock, and the output eﬀect is
still more than one-third the size of the peak eﬀect ten quarters after the shock.
These realizations led to a loss of interest, after the early 1980s, in models of the eﬀects
of monetary disturbances based upon imperfect information — and indeed, in a loss of
interest in monetary models of business ﬂuctuations altogether, among those who found
unpalatable the assumption of non-informational reasons for slow adjustment of wages or
prices. However, this rejection of the Phelpsian insight that information imperfections play
a crucial role in the monetary transmission mechanism may have been premature. For
the unfortunate predictions just mentioned relate to the speciﬁc model presented by Lucas










Figure 2: Estimated impulse response of real GDP to an unexpected interest-rate reduction.
Source: Christiano et al. (2001).
(1972), but not necessarily to alternative versions of the imperfect-information theory.
Persistent eﬀects of monetary disturbances on real activity can instead be obtained in a
model that varies certain of Lucas’ assumptions. In particular, one may argue that the Lucas
model does not take seriously enough the Phelpsian insight that informational isolation of the
separate decisionmakers in an economy — captured by the parable of separate “islands” — is
an important source of uncertainty on the part of each of them as to what their optimal action
should be. For in the Lucas model, the only information that matters to decisionmakers,
about which they have imperfect information, is the current value of an exogenous aggregate
state variable: the current level of nominal GDP (or equivalently in that model, the current
money supply). Instead, for the “isolated and apprehensive ... Pinteresque ﬁgures” in an
economy of the kind imagined by Phelps (1970, p. 22), an important source of uncertainty
is the unknowability of the minds of others.
5Here I follow Phelps (1983) in considering a model in which the optimal price for any
given supplier of goods to charge depends not only upon the state of aggregate demand,
but also upon the average level of prices charged by other suppliers. It then follows that
the price set by that supplier depends not only upon its own estimate of current aggregate
demand, but also upon its estimate of the average estimate of others, and similarly (because
others are understood to face a similar decision) upon its estimate of the average estimate of
that average estimate, and so on. The entire inﬁnite hierarchy of progressively higher-order
expectations matters (to some extent) for the prices that are set, and hence for the resulting
level of real activity.
This is important because, as Phelps argues, higher-order expectations may be even
slower to adjust in response to economic disturbances. Phelps (1983) suggests that rational
expectations in the sense of Lucas (1972) are a less plausible assumption when the hypothesis
must be applied not only to estimates of the current money supply, but also to an entire
inﬁnite hierarchy of higher-order expectations. But here I show that higher-order expecta-
tions can indeed be expected to adjust more slowly to disturbances, even under fully rational
expectations.1 The reason is that even when observations allow suppliers to infer that ag-
gregate demand has increased, resulting in a substantial change in their own estimate of
current conditions, these observations may provide less information about the way in which
the perceptions of others may have changed, and still less about others’ perceptions of others’
perceptions. Thus in the model presented here, a monetary disturbance has real eﬀects, not
so much because the disturbance passes unnoticed as because its occurrence is not common
knowledge in the sense of the theory of games.
A second important departure from the Lucas (1972) model is to abandon the assumption
that monetary disturbances become public information — and hence part of the information
set of every agent — with a delay of only one period. Were we to maintain this assumption, it
would matter little that in the present model output depends not only upon the discrepancy
1Previous illustrations of the way that additional sources of persistence in economic ﬂuctuations can be
created when higher-order expectations matter include Townsend (1983a, 1983b) and Sargent (1991). These
applications do not, however, consider the issue of the neutrality of money.
6between qt and qtjt, but on the discrepancy between qt and higher-order average expectations
as well. For if the monetary disturbance at date t is part of every supplier’s information
set at date t + 1 (and this is furthermore common knowledge), then any eﬀect upon qt+1
of this disturbance must increase not only qt+1jt+1 but also all higher-order expectations by
exactly the same amount. (The argument is exactly the same as in our consideration above
of the eﬀect upon ﬁrst-order average expectations.) We would again obtain (1.2), and the
criticisms of the Lucas model mentioned above would continue to apply.
Hence it is desirable to relax that assumption. But how can one realistically assume
otherwise, given the fact that monetary statistics are reported promptly in widely dissem-
inated media? Here it is crucial to distinguish between public information — information
that is available in principle to anyone who chooses to look it up — and the information
of which decision-makers are actually aware. Rather than supposing that people are fully
aware of all publicly available information — a notion stressed in early deﬁnitions of “ratio-
nal expectations”, and of critical importance for early econometric tests of the Lucas model2
— and that information limitations must therefore depend upon the failure of some private
transactions to be made public, I shall follow Sims (1998, 2001) in supposing that the critical
bottleneck is instead the limited capacity of private decision-makers to pay attention to all
of the information in their environment.3
In the model presented below, I assume that each decision-maker acts on the basis of his or
her own subjective perception of the state of aggregate demand, that I model as observation of
the true value with error (a subjective error that is idiosyncratic to the individual observer).4
2Lucas (1977, sec. 9), however, implicitly endorses relaxation of this position, when he suggests that it is
reasonable to suppose that traders do not bother to track aggregate variables closely. “An optimizing trader
will process those prices of most importance to his decision problem most frequently and carefully, those of
less importance less so, and most prices not at all. Of the many sources of risk of importance to him, the
business cycle and aggregate behavior generally is, for most agents, of no special importance, and there is
no reason for traders to specialize their information systems for diagnosing general movements correctly.”
3A similar gap between the information that is publicly available and the information of which deci-
sionmakers are actually aware is posited in the independent recent work of Mankiw and Reis (2001). The
Mankiw-Reis model is further compared to the present proposal in section 4.3 below.
4The implications of introducing idiosyncratic errors of this kind in the information available to individual
agents has recently been studied in the game-theoretic literature on “global games” (e.g., Morris and Shin,
2001). As in the application here, that literature has stressed that in the presence of strategic complemen-
7That is, all measurements of current conditions are obtained through a “noisy channel” in
the communications-theoretic sense (e.g., Ziemer and Tranter, 1995). Given the existence
of private measurement error, agents will not only fail to immediately notice a disturbance
to aggregate demand with complete precision, but they will continue to be uncertain about
whether others know that others know that others know .... about it — even after they can
be fairly conﬁdent about the accuracy of their own estimate of the aggregate state. Thus
it is the existence of a gap between reality and perception that makes the problem of other
minds such a signiﬁcant one for economic dynamics.
Moreover, given the use of a limited “channel capacity” for monitoring current conditions,
it will not matter how much and how accurate of information may be made “public” (e.g.,
on the internet). Indeed, in the model below I assume that all aggregate disturbances are
“public information”, in the sense of being available in principle to anyone who chooses to
observe them with suﬃcient precision, and in the sense of being actually observed (albeit
with error) by every decision-maker in the entire economy. There is no need for the device of
separate markets on diﬀerent “islands” in order for there to be imperfect common knowledge.
(Presumably, Phelps intended the “islands” as a metaphor for this sort of failure of subjective
experience to be shared all along — though who can claim to know other minds?) Nor is
there any need for a second type of disturbance (the random variations in relative demand
of the Lucas model) in order to create a non-trivial signal-extraction problem. The “channel
noise” generated by each decision-maker’s own over-burdened nervous system suﬃces for this
purpose.
This emphasis upon the limited accuracy of private perceptions is in the spirit of recent
interest in weakening the idealized assumptions of rational-decision theory in macroeco-
nomics and elsewhere (e.g., Sargent, 1993). Limitations upon the ability of people (and
animals) to accurately discriminate among alternative stimuli in their environments are bet-
ter documented (and admit of more precise measurement) than most other kinds of cognitive
tarities, even a small degree of noise in the private signals can have substantial consequences for aggregate
outcomes, owing to the greater uncertainty that is created about higher-order expectations.
8limitations, having been the subject of decades of investigation in the branch of psychology
known as “psychophysics” (e.g., Green and Swets, 1966). While it might seem that the in-
troduction of a discrepancy between objective economic data and private perceptions could
weaken the predictions of economic theory to the point of making the theory uninteresting,
the type of theory proposed here — which assumes that agents correctly understand the char-
acteristics of the noisy channel through which they observe the world, and respond optimally
to the history of their subjective observations — is still relatively tightly parameterized. The
proposed generalization here of a standard neoclassical model adds only a single additional
free parameter, which can be interpreted as measuring the rate of information ﬂow in the
noisy channel, as in Sims (2001).
Section 2 develops a simple model of pricing decisions in an environment characterized by
random variation in nominal spending and imperfect common knowledge of these ﬂuctuations
for the reason just discussed. It shows how one can characterize equilibrium output and
inﬂation dynamics in terms of a ﬁnite system of diﬀerence equations, despite the fact that
expectations of arbitrarily high order matter for optimal pricing policy. Section 3 then derives
the implications of the model for the real eﬀects of monetary disturbances, in the special case
where erratic monetary policy causes nominal GDP to follow a random walk with drift, as
in the Lucas model. It is shown that not only are deviations of output from potential due to
monetary disturbances not purely transitory, but their degree of persistence may in principle
be arbitrarily long. Indeed, arbitrarily long persistence of such real eﬀects is possible (though
less empirically plausible) even in the case of quite accurate individual perceptions of the
current state of aggregate demand. The dynamics of higher-order expectations are also
explicitly characterized, and it is shown that higher-order expectations respond less rapidly
to a disturbance, as argued above.
Section 4 then compares imperfect common knowledge as a source of price inertia, and
hence of real eﬀects of monetary policy, to the more familiar hypothesis of “sticky prices,” in
the sense of a failure of prices to be continuously updated in response to changing conditions.
In the case of a random walk in nominal GDP, the predicted dynamics of output and inﬂation
9are essentially the same in the model developed here and in the familiar Calvo (1983) model
of staggered price adjustment — corresponding to any given assumed average frequency of
price adjustment there is a rate of information acquisition that leads to the same equilibrium
dynamics in the imperfect-information model, despite continuous adjustment of all prices.
However, this equivalence does not hold for more generally stochastic processes for nominal
GDP. In the case of positive serial correlation of nominal GDP growth (the more realistic
speciﬁcation as far as actual monetary disturbances are concerned), the predictions of the
two models diﬀer, and in a way that suggests that an assumption of incomplete common
knowledge of aggregate disturbances may better match the actual dynamics of output and
inﬂation following monetary disturbances. Section 5 concludes.
2 Incomplete Common Knowledge: A Simple Example
Here I illustrate the possibility of a theory of the kind sketched above by deriving a log-linear
approximation to a model of optimal price-setting under imperfect information. The log-
linear approximation is convenient, as in Lucas (1973) and many other papers, in allowing
a relatively simple treatment of equilibrium with a signal-extraction problem.
2.1 Perceptions of Aggregate Demand and Pricing Behavior
Consider a model of monopolistically competitive goods supply of the kind now standard in
the sticky-price literature. The producer of good i chooses the price pi
t at which the good is










where period t proﬁts are given by
Π(p;P;Y ) = m(Y )[Y (p=P)
1¡µ ¡ C(Y (p=P)
¡µ;Y )]: (2.4)
Here Yt is the Dixit-Stiglitz index of real aggregate demand, and Pt the corresponding price
index, the evolution of each of which is taken to be independent of ﬁrm i’s pricing policy.
10Firm i expects to sell quantity yi
t = Yt(pi
t=Pt)¡µ if it charges price pi
t, for some µ > 1: Real
production costs are given by C(yi
t;Yt), where the second argument allows for dependence
of factor prices upon aggregate activity. Finally, (2.4) weights proﬁts in each state by the
stochastic discount factor m(Yt) in that state, so that (2.3) represents the ﬁnancial-market
valuation of the ﬁrm’s random proﬁt stream. (See, e.g., Woodford, 2001.) The model here
abstracts from all real disturbances.
I assume that the ﬁrm can choose its price independently each period, given private
information at that time about the aggregate state variables. In this case, the pricing
problem is a purely static one each period, of choosing pi




t denotes expectation conditional upon i’s private information set at date t. The ﬁrst-order





t;Pt;Yt)] = 0: (2.5)
In the absence of information limitations, each supplier would choose the same price (which
then must equal Pt), so that equilibrium output would have to equal the natural rate of
output ¯ Y , deﬁned as the level such that Πp(P;P; ¯ Y ) = 0: (This is independent of P:)
To simplify the signal-extraction issues, I shall approximate (2.5) by a log-linear relation,
obtained by Taylor-series expansion around the full-information equilibrium values pi
t=Pt = 1
and Yt = ¯ Y :5 This takes the form
pt(i) = ptjt(i) + »ytjt(i); (2.6)
introducing the notation pt(i) ´ logpi
t; pt ´ logPt; yt ´ log(Yt=¯ Y ); and letting xt+jjt(i) ´
Ei
txt+j for any variable x and any horizon j ¸ 0: Assuming that C is such that Cy > 0;
Cyy ¸ 0; and CyY > 0; one can show that » > 0: I shall assume, however, that it satisﬁes
5We abstract here from any sources of real growth, as a result of which the full-information equilibrium
level of output, or “natural rate” of output, is constant. Nothing material in the subsequent analysis would
be diﬀerent were we to assume steady trend growth of the natural rate of output. We abstract here from
stochastic variation in the natural rate so that producers need only form inferences about the monetary
disturbances. One advantage of this of this simpliﬁcation is that it makes clear the fact that the present
model, unlike that of Lucas (1972), does not depend upon the existence of both real and nominal disturbances
in order for there to be real eﬀects of nominal disturbances.
11» < 1, so that the pricing decisions of separate producers are strategic complements (again
see Woodford, 2001).
Finally, I specify the demand side of the economy by assuming a given stochastic process
for aggregate nominal expenditure. A traditional justiﬁcation for such an assumption is that
the central bank determines an exogenous process for the money supply, and that there is
a constant, or at any rate exogenous, velocity of money. Yet we need not assume anything
as speciﬁc as this about the monetary transmission mechanism, or about the nature of
monetary policy. All that matters for the analysis below is (i) that the disturbance driving
the nominal GDP process is a monetary policy shock, and (ii) that the dynamic response of
nominal GDP to such shocks is of a particular form. The assumption of a particular response
of nominal GDP under historical policy is something that can be checked against time
series evidence, regardless of how one believes that this response should best be explained.
Direct speciﬁcation of a stochastic process for nominal GDP eliminates the need for further
discussion of the details of aggregate demand determination, and for purposes of asking
whether our model is consistent with the observed responses of real activity and inﬂation to
monetary disturbances, this degree of detail suﬃces.6
Letting qt denote the exogenous process log(PtYt=¯ Y ), and averaging (2.6) over i, we
obtain
pt = »qtjt + (1 ¡ »)ptjt; (2.7)
introducing the notation xt+jjt ´
R
xt+jjt(i)di: The (log) price level is then a weighted average
of the average estimate of current (log) nominal GDP (the exogenous forcing process) and
the average estimate of the (log) price level itself.
Iterating (2.7) allows us to express pt as a weighted average of the average estimate of qt,
6My point here is essentially the same as that of Christiano et al. (1998), who argue that it is possible to
test the predictions of their model by computing the predicted responses to a given money-growth process,
even if they do not believe (and do not assume, in their VAR strategy for identifying the eﬀects of monetary
policy shocks) that monetary policy is correctly described by an exogenous process for money growth. Of
course, if one wanted to ask a question such as what the eﬀect would be of an improvement in suppliers’
information, it would be necessary to take a stand on whether or not the nominal GDP process should
change. This would depend on how aggregate nominal expenditure is determined.

















Thus the (log) price level can be expressed as a weighted average of expectations and higher-
order expectations of the current level of (log) nominal GDP, as in Phelps (1983). Since








Thus output deviates from the natural rate only insofar as the level of current nominal GDP
is not common knowledge. But this equation diﬀers from (1.1), the implication of the Lucas
model, in that higher-order expectations matter, and not simply the average estimate of
current nominal GDP.
2.2 Equilibrium Inﬂation Dynamics
To consider a speciﬁc example, suppose that the growth rate of nominal GDP follows a
ﬁrst-order autoregressive process,
∆qt = (1 ¡ ½)g + ½∆qt¡1 + ut; (2.10)
where ∆ is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator, 0 · ½ < 1; and ut is a zero-mean Gaussian white
noise process. Here g represents the long-run average rate of growth of nominal GDP, while
the parameter ½ indexes the degree of serial correlation in nominal GDP growth; in the
special case that ½ = 0; nominal GDP follows a random walk with drift g. The disturbance
ut is assumed to represent a monetary policy shock, which therefore has no eﬀect upon the
real determinants of supply costs discussed above.








That is to say, knowledge of the current value of Xt would suﬃce to compute not only the
equilibrium values of pt and yt, but the conditional expectations of their values in all future
periods as well. In terms of this vector, the law of motion (2.10) can equivalently be written


















With incomplete information, however, average expectations and higher-order average ex-
pectations X
(k)
t will also matter for the determination of prices and output and of their
future evolution.
Suppose that the only information received by supplier i in period t is the noisy signal
zt(i) = qt + vt(i); (2.12)
where vt(i) is a mean-zero Gaussian white noise error term, distributed independently both
of the history of fundamental disturbances fut¡jg and of the observation errors of all other
suppliers. I shall suppose that the complete information set of supplier i when setting pi
t
consists of the history of the subjective observations fzt(i)g; this means, in particular, that
the person making the pricing decision does not actually observe (or does not pay attention
to!) the quantity sold at that price.
Suppose, however, that the supplier forms optimal estimates of the aggregate state vari-
ables given this imperfect information. Speciﬁcally, I shall assume that the supplier forms
minimum-mean-squared-error estimates that are updated in real time using a Kalman ﬁl-
ter.7 Let us suppose that the supplier (correctly) believes that the economy’s aggregate state
7This is optimal if the supplier seeks to maximize a log-quadratic approximation to his or her exact
objective function; however, the exact objective function implied by the model above would not be log-
quadratic.
14evolves according to a law of motion
¯ Xt = ¯ c + M ¯ Xt¡1 + mut; (2.13)














Thus our conjecture is that only a particular linear combination of the higher-order expec-
tations X
(k)
t is needed in order to forecast the future evolution of that vector itself. Our
interest in forecasting the evolution of this particular linear combination stems from the fact
that (2.8) implies that pt is equal to the ﬁrst element of Ft: In terms of our extended state
vector, we can write
pt = e
0
3 ¯ Xt; (2.15)
introducing the notation ej to refer to the jth unit vector (i.e., a vector the jth element of
which is one, while all other elements are zeros).
In terms of this extended state vector, the observation equation (2.12) is of the form
zt(i) = e
0
1 ¯ Xt + vt(i): (2.16)
It then follows (see, e.g., Chow, 1975; Harvey, 1989) that i’s optimal estimate of the state
vector evolves according to a Kalman ﬁlter equation
¯ Xtjt(i) = ¯ Xtjt¡1(i) + k[zt(i) ¡ e
0
1 ¯ Xtjt¡1]; (2.17)
where k is the vector of Kalman gains (to be speciﬁed), and the forecast prior to the period
t observation is given by
¯ Xtjt¡1(i) = ¯ c + M ¯ Xt¡1jt¡1(i): (2.18)
Substituting (2.18) into (2.17), we obtain a law of motion for i’s estimate of the current
state vector. Integrating this over i (and using (2.16) to observe that the average signal is
15just qt = e0
1 ¯ Xt), we obtain a law of motion for the average estimate of the current state
vector,
¯ Xtjt = ¯ Xtjt¡1 + ke
0
1[ ¯ Xt ¡ ¯ Xtjt¡1]
= ¯ c + ke
0
1M ¯ Xt¡1 + (I ¡ ke
0
1)M ¯ Xt¡1jt¡1 + ke
0
1mut:
Next we observe that (2.14) implies that




» 0 1 ¡ » 0
0 » 0 1 ¡ »
#
:
Substituting the above expression for ¯ Xtjt; we obtain
Ft = ¯ »¯ c + ˆ ke
0
1M ¯ Xt¡1 + (¯ » ¡ ˆ ke
0
1)M ¯ Xt¡1jt¡1 + ˆ ke
0
1mut; (2.20)
where ˆ k ´ ¯ »k:
We wish now to determine whether the laws of motion (2.11) and (2.20) for the elements
of ¯ Xt can in fact be expressed in the form (2.13), as conjectured. We note ﬁrst that (2.11)

















where c; A and a are deﬁned as in (2.11), and the vectors d and h and the matrices G and
H are yet to be determined.
Making these substitutions in (2.20), we then obtain
Ft = ˆ c + ˆ kA1Xt¡1 + [»A + (1 ¡ »)G ¡ ˆ kA1]Xt¡1jt¡1 + (1 ¡ »)HFt¡1jt¡1 + ˆ kut; (2.21)
where
ˆ c ´ »c + (1 ¡ »)d; (2.22)
and A1 is the ﬁrst row of A; i.e., the row vector [1 + ½ ¡ ½]: Finally, we note that (2.19)
for date t ¡ 1 implies that
(1 ¡ »)Ft¡1jt¡1 = Ft¡1 ¡ »Xt¡1jt¡1:
16Using this substitution to eliminate Ft¡1jt¡1 from (2.21), we ﬁnally obtain
Ft = ˆ c + ˆ kA1Xt¡1 + HFt¡1 + [»A + (1 ¡ »)G ¡ »H ¡ ˆ kA1]Xt¡1jt¡1 + ˆ kut: (2.23)
This has the same form as the lower two rows of (2.13) if it happens that the expression in
square brackets is a zero matrix.
In this case, we are able to make the identiﬁcations
d = ˆ c; (2.24)
G = ˆ kA1; (2.25)
h = ˆ k: (2.26)
Given (2.22), (2.24) requires that d = c; and (2.25) and (2.26) uniquely identify G and h
once we know the value of the gain vector ˆ k: Using solution (2.25) for G, we observe that
the expression in square brackets in (2.23) is a zero matrix if and only if
H = A ¡ ˆ kA1: (2.27)
Thus we have a unique solution for H as well. It follows that once we determine the vector
of Kalman gains k; and hence the reduced vector ˆ k; we can uniquely identify the coeﬃcients
of the law of motion (2.13) for the state vector ¯ Xt: This then allows us to determine the
equilibrium dynamics of pt and yt, using (2.15) and the identity yt = qt ¡ pt:
2.3 Optimal Filtering
It remains to determine the vector of Kalman gains k in the Kalman ﬁlter equation (2.17) for
the optimal updating of individual suppliers’ estimates of the aggregate state vector. Let us
deﬁne the variance-covariance matrices of forecast errors on the part of individual suppliers:
Σ ´ varf ¯ Xt ¡ ¯ Xtjt¡1(i)g;
V ´ varf ¯ Xt ¡ ¯ Xtjt(i)g;
17Note that these matrices will be the same for all suppliers i, since the observation errors are
assumed to have the same stochastic properties for each of them.














v > 0 is the variance of the individual observation error vt(i) each period. Relations
(2.28) – (2.29) then imply that





¡1 ¯ »Σe1: (2.30)
Thus once we have determined the matrix Σ; ˆ k is given by (2.30), which allows us to solve
for the coeﬃcients of the law of motion (2.13) as above.
The computation of the variance-covariance matrix of forecast errors also follows standard
lines. The transition equation (2.13) and the observation equation (2.16) imply that the
matrices Σ and V satisfy












u is the variance of the innovation term ut in the exogenous process (2.10). Combining














The matrix Σ is thus obtained by solving for a ﬁxed point of the nonlinear matrix equation
(2.31). Of course, this equation itself depends upon the elements of M and m, and hence
upon the elements of G;H; and h, in addition to parameters of the model. These latter
coeﬃcients can in turn be determined as functions of Σ using (2.25) – (2.27) and (2.30).
8Add refs!!!
18Thus we obtain a larger ﬁxed-point equation to solve for Σ, speciﬁed solely in turns of model
parameters.
Except in the special case discussed below, this system is too complicated to allow us to
obtain further analytical results. Numerical solution for Σ in the case of given parameter
values remains possible, however, and in practice proves not to be diﬃcult.
3 The Size and Persistence of the Real Eﬀects of Nom-
inal Disturbances
We now turn to the insights that can be obtained regarding the eﬀects of nominal distur-
bances from the solution of the example described in the previous section. In particular, we
shall consider the impulse responses of output and inﬂation in response to an innovation ut




One question of considerable interest concerns the extent to which an unexpected increase
in nominal GDP growth aﬀects real activity, as opposed to simply raising the money prices
paid for goods. But of no less interest is the question of the length of time for which any
real eﬀect persists following the shock. This is an especially important question given that
the inability to explain persistent output eﬀects of monetary policy shocks was one of the
more notable of the perceived weaknesses of the ﬁrst generation of asymmetric-information
models.
3.1 The Case of a Random Walk in Nominal Spending
In considering the question of persistence, a useful benchmark is to consider the predicted
response to an unexpected permanent increase in the level of nominal GDP. In this case,
the subsequent dynamics of prices and output are due solely to the adjustment over time of
9It should be evident that it is only the relative size of the innovation variances that matters for the
determination of the Kalman gains k, and hence of the coeﬃcients M and m in the law of motion. It is also
only the relative variance that is determined by a particular assumed rate of information ﬂow in the “noisy
channel” through which a supplier monitors current aggregate demand. See Sims (2001) for details of the
computation of the rate of information ﬂow.
19a discrepancy that has arisen between the level of nominal spending and the existing level
of prices, and not to any predictable further changes in the level of nominal spending itself.
This corresponds to the computation of impulse response functions in a special case of the
model of the previous section, the case in which ½ = 0; so that the log of nominal GDP
follows a random walk with drift.
In this special case, the equations of the previous section can be further simpliﬁed. First,
we note that in this case, the state vector Xt may be reduced to the single element qt. The
law of motion (2.11) continues to apply that now c = g; A = 1, and a = 1 are all scalars.
The law of motion for the aggregate state can again be written in the form (2.13), where Ft
is deﬁned as in (2.14); but now Ft is a scalar, and the blocks G;H and h of M and m are
each scalars as well. Equation (2.19) continues to apply, but now with the deﬁnition
¯ » ´ [» 1 ¡ »]:
Equation (2.26) holds as before, but now ˆ k is a scalar; equations (2.25) and (2.27) reduce to
G = ˆ k;
H = 1 ¡ ˆ k:
Substituting these solutions for the elements of M(ˆ k) and m(ˆ k); we can solve (2.31) for
the matrix Σ(ˆ k) in the case of any given reduced Kalman gain ˆ k. The upper left equation
in this system is given by








This equation involves only Σ11, and is independent of ˆ k: It reduces to a quadratic equation
in Σ11; which has two real roots, one positive and one negative. Since the variance Σ11 must














20The lower left equation in the system (2.31), in turn, involves only Σ21 and Σ11; and
given that we have already solved for Σ11; this equation can be solved for Σ21: We obtain





u) + [1 + 4(¾2
v=¾2
u)]1=2
(2=ˆ k) ¡ 1 + [1 + 4(¾2
v=¾2
u)]1=2 : (3.2)
Finally, (2.30) expresses ˆ k as a function of Σ, which in fact depends only upon the elements
Σ11 and Σ21. Substituting expressions (3.1) – (3.2) into this relation, we obtain a quadratic






2 + »ˆ k ¡ » = 0: (3.3)
It is easily seen that for any parameters »;¾2
u;¾2
v > 0; equation (3.3) has two real roots,
one satisfying
0 < ˆ k < 1; (3.4)
and another that is negative. Substituting our previous solutions for M(ˆ k) and m(ˆ k) into
(2.13), we note that this law of motion implies that
qt ¡ Ft = (1 ¡ ˆ k)(qt¡1 ¡ Ft¡1) + (1 ¡ ˆ k)ut: (3.5)
Law of motion (3.5) implies that qt¡Ft; which measures the discrepancy between the actual
level of nominal spending and a certain average of higher-order expectations regarding cur-
rent nominal spending, is a stationary random variable if and only if j1¡ˆ kj < 1: This requires
that ˆ k > 0; and so excludes the negative root of (3.3). Thus if we are to obtain a solution in
which the variances of forecast errors are ﬁnite and constant over time, as assumed above,












v > 0: (3.7)
213.2 Dynamics of Real Activity
Since in this special case, pt = Ft; (3.5) immediately implies that (log) real GDP yt evolves
according to
yt = º(yt¡1 + ut); (3.8)
where º = 1 ¡ ˆ k and ˆ k is given by (3.6). Since 0 < º < 1; this describes a stationary
process with positive serial correlation. The implied eﬀect of a monetary shock at date t
upon current and expected subsequent real activity is given by
Et(yt+j) ¡ Et¡1(yt+j) = º
j+1ut;
which holds for all j ¸ 0: Thus the same coeﬃcient º determines both the size of the initial
impact upon real activity of a monetary shock (yt is increased by ºut), and the degree of
persistence of such an eﬀect (the eﬀect on output j periods later decays as ºj).
While the model implies that the real eﬀects of a monetary shock die out with time,
output is not predicted to again equal the natural rate on average in any ﬁnite time, as in
the Lucas model. Indeed, the degree of persistence of such real eﬀects may be arbitrarily
great. For (3.6) implies that ˆ k may be an arbitrarily small positive quantity (so that º is
arbitrarily close to 1), if ° is small enough; and the half-life of output disturbances tends to
inﬁnity as º approaches one.
More generally, the degree of persistence is observed to be a monotonically decreasing
function of °, which depends both upon » and upon ¾2
v=¾2
u: Not surprisingly, this implies
that persistence is greater the larger is ¾2
v relative to ¾2
u; that is, the less the information
contained in the individual suppliers’ subjective perceptions of the state of nominal GDP.
And if this information is small enough, persistence may arbitrarily great. This may seem
little diﬀerent from the conclusion in the case of the Lucas model that the output eﬀects of a
monetary disturbance may persist for a substantial time if it takes a long time for changes in
the money supply to become public information. But because the bottleneck in our case is
assumed to be the inaccuracy of individual subjective perceptions, rather than limitations of
the statistics that are publicly available should people bother to pay attention, the mere fact
22that monetary data quickly enter the public domain does not in itself imply that perceptions
of the state of aggregate demand must be accurate.
Even more interestingly, persistence is predicted to be greater the smaller is »; which is
to say, the greater the extent of “real rigidity” in the sense of Ball and Romer (1990), and
hence the greater the degree of strategic complementarity in individual suppliers’ pricing
decisions.10 In fact, the model implies that regardless of the degree of accuracy of the
suppliers’ observations of the aggregate state — as long as they are not perfect — the degree
of persistence of the real eﬀects of a monetary policy shock can be arbitrarily great, if the
degree of “real rigidity” is suﬃciently great (i.e., » is suﬃciently small)!
This means that substantial real eﬀects of monetary policy, and signiﬁcant persistence of
such eﬀects, do not depend upon private parties being wholly ignorant of the occurrence of the
disturbance to monetary policy. If ¾2
v=¾2
u is not too large, each individual supplier will have
a fairly accurate estimate of current aggregate demand at the time of setting its price, and
individual estimates qtjt(i) will quickly adjust by nearly as much as the permanent change
in nominal spending that has occurred. Nonetheless, prices may be quite slow to adjust,
owing to continuing uncertainty about others’ estimates of current aggregate demand, and
even greater uncertainty about others’ estimates of others’ estimates. Thus the sluggishness
of higher-order expectations stressed by Phelps (1983) can play a critical role in explaining
both the size and persistence of the real eﬀects of monetary policy.
3.3 Dynamics of Higher-Order Expectations
This can be shown explicitly through an analysis of the impulse responses of higher-order
average expectations following a monetary shock. While we have seen above that it is
not necessary to solve for the complete hierarchy of expectations in order to solve for the
equilibrium dynamics of output (only the particular average of higher-order expectations
represented by Ft), consideration of the dynamics of expectations at diﬀerent levels can
10See Woodford (2001) for further discussion of the interpretation of this parameter and various factors
that can make it small in an actual economy.
23provide further insight into the reason for the sluggishness of price adjustment in this model.
Similar Kalman-ﬁltering techniques as in the previous section can be used to determine
the dynamics of average expectations at each level of the hierarchy. Let q
(k)
t denote the
average k-th order expectation at date t regarding the current level of (log) nominal GDP,
where q
(0)








t¡1 + akut (3.9)
for each k ¸ 0; where for k = 0 we have ®00 = 1 and a0 = 1. We wish to determine the
coeﬃcients ®kj and ak for higher values of k.
Supplier i’s estimate of the value of q
(k)
t should evolve according to a Kalman ﬁlter
equation of the form
q
(k)
tjt (i) = q
(k)
tjt¡1(i) + ·k+1(zt(i) ¡ ztjt¡1(i));
where the k + 1st order Kalman gain ·k+1 remains to be determined. Substituting the











Then substituting the average forecasts at date t ¡ 1 implied by the assumed law of motion
(3.9), and the law of motion itself for q
(0)













This yields a law of motion for the next higher order of expectations of the desired form
(3.9).
Identifying the coeﬃcients ®k+1;j and ak+1 with the ones appearing in this last relation,
we obtain equations that can be used to solve recursively for these coeﬃcients at each order
of expectations. For each k ¸ 1; we ﬁnd that
®k0 = ·k;
®kj = ·k¡j ¡ ·k+1¡j for each ; 0 < j < k;
24®kk = 1 ¡ ·1;
ak = ·k:
Thus once we determine the sequence of Kalman gains ·k; we know the complete law of
motion (3.9) for all orders of expectations.






tjt¡1(i); qt ¡ qtjt¡1(i)g;





for each k ¸ 0:11 These covariances in turn satisfy a Riccati equation,









for each k ¸ 0: Note that once we know the value of ¾00, this is a linear equation in the
other covariances; and we have already solved for ¾00 = Σ11 in (3.1).
Substituting the above solution for the ®kj and ak coeﬃcients as functions of the Kalman
gains, and using (3.10) to replace each covariance ¾k0 by a multiple of ·k+1; it is possible to
rewrite (3.11) in terms of the Kalman gains alone. We obtain the relation
·k+1 =
1 ¡ ·1

















for each k ¸ 1: This relation allows us to solve recursively for each of the ·k; starting from
the initial value
·1 =






implied by (3.10) using (3.1) for ¾00:
Figure 3 gives a numerical illustration of the implied dynamics of higher-order expecta-
tions in response to an immediate, permanent unit increase in nominal spending. The ﬁgure
11Note that in the case k = 0; this equation is equivalent to the ﬁrst row of (2.28.)
















Figure 3: Impulse response functions for higher-order expectations q
(k)
t ; for various values of
k. The case k = 0 indicates the exogenous disturbance to log nominal GDP itself.
shows the impulse responses of q
(0)
t (nominal GDP itself), q
(1)
t (the average estimate of current
nominal GDP), q
(2)
t (the average estimate of the average estimate), and so on, up through
the eighth-order expectation q(8), in the case of a relative innovation variance ¾2
v=¾2
u = 4:
One observes that even with this degree of noise in subjective estimates of current nominal
spending, the average estimate of current nominal GDP adjusts fairly rapidly following the
disturbance: forty percent of the eventual adjustment occurs in the period of the increase in
nominal GDP itself, and eighty percent has occurred within two periods later. Higher-order
expectations instead adjust much more sluggishly. Eighth-order expectations adjust only a
ﬁfth as much as do ﬁrst-order expectations during the period of the disturbance; even three
periods later, they have not yet adjusted by as much as ﬁrst-order expectations do in the
period of the disturbance, and it is only nine periods after the disturbance that they have
adjusted by eighty percent of the size of the disturbance.
26The extent to which these diﬀerent orders of average expectations matter for pricing
depends, of course, on the degree of strategic complementarity between the pricing decisions
of diﬀerent suppliers. If » is near one, then the average price level will adjust at the rate
that the average estimate q
(1)
t does, and the real eﬀects of the disturbance will be modest
after the period of the shock, and the next period or so.12 On the other hand, if » is small,
so that strategic complementarity is great, the sluggishness of higher-order expectations can
matter a great deal. Woodford (2001) suggests that » = :15 is an empirically plausible value
for the U.S. In this case, the impulse response of the average price level would be a weighted
average of those shown in Figure 1 (and the responses of still higher-order expectations, not
shown), with a weight of only :15 on the response of ﬁrst-order expectations. More than
half the weight is put on expectations of order k > 4; and more than a quarter of the weight
is put on expectations of order k > 8; i.e., expectations that adjust more slowly than any
that are shown in the ﬁgure. Thus the insight of Phelps (1983), that the dependence of
aggregate outcomes upon higher-order expectations can be an important source of inertia in
the response of prices to nominal disturbances, is born out.
4 Comparison with a Model of Sticky Prices
It may be worth brieﬂy considering the extent to which the predictions of such a model
resemble, and diﬀer from, those of a model in which prices do not immediately adjust to
nominal disturbances, not because price-setters are unaware of the adjustment that would
best serve their interests at any of the times at which they actually consider changing their
prices, but simply because they do not continuously reconsider their prices. This familiar
hypothesis of “sticky prices” is clearly not entirely unrelated to the hypothesis of incomplete
information. In particular, insofar as suppliers behave in the way assumed in models with
sticky prices, they surely do so not primarily in order to economize on the cost of price changes
themselves — literal “menu costs” are in most cases quite small — but rather in order to
12If » exceeds 1, as is theoretically possible (Woodford, 2001), then prices will adjust even more rapidly
than does the average expectation of current nominal GDP.
27economize on the cost of having to make more frequent decisions about whether their current
prices are signiﬁcantly out of line or not.13 And there is obviously a close relation between
the hypothesis that there are substantial costs associated with constant close monitoring of
current conditions (the hypothesis explored in this paper) and the hypothesis that there are
substantial costs associated with constant reconsideration of how close one’s current prices
are to those that are optimal under current conditions.
For this reason, it is interesting to ask how similar or diﬀerent the implications of the
hypothesis of incomplete common knowledge for aggregate dynamics are to those of a model
with sticky prices. Here I show that the dynamics of aggregate output and the aggregate price
index derived above in the case of a random walk in nominal GDP are indistinguishable from
those predicted by a standard sticky price model, namely, a discrete-time version of the model
proposed by Calvo (1983). Thus it need not be possible to distinguish among these models
empirically, using aggregate data alone. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the models
make identical predictions regardless of the nature of monetary policy, as consideration of a
more general policy speciﬁcation will show.
4.1 Dynamics of Real Activity under the Calvo Pricing Model
In the well-known Calvo (1983) model of staggered pricing, the price charged by each supplier
is reconsidered only at random intervals of time, with the probability that any given price will
be reconsidered within a particular time interval being independent of which price it is, how
long ago it was last reconsidered, and the level of the current price (relative either to other
prices or to other aspects of current market conditions). In this case (and proceeding directly
to a log-linear approximation to the optimal pricing condition), (2.6) becomes instead




jEt[pt+j + »yt+j] (4.1)
13Zbaracki et al. (1999) document this in the case of a single industrial ﬁrm whose operations they study
in detail. They ﬁnd that the ﬁrm’s “managerial costs” of price adjustment are many times larger than the
physical costs of price changes.
28for any supplier i that reconsiders its price in period t, where 0 < ® < 1 is the probability
that any given price is not reconsidered during any given period, and 0 < ¯ < 1 is again the
discount factor in (2.3). This says that the price chosen is a weighted average of the prices
that would be optimal at the various dates and in the various states of the world in which
the price chosen at date t has not yet been revised. Because we now assume full information,
subjective expectations at date t are now replaced by an expectation conditional upon the
history of disturbances through that date. If instead i does not reconsider its price in period
t, then we have simply pt(i) = pt¡1(i):
This model of pricing results (see, e.g., Woodford, 2001) in an aggregate supply relation
of the form
∆pt = ·yt + ¯Et∆pt+1; (4.2)
where
· =
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)
®
» > 0: (4.3)
This relation is sometimes called the “New Keynesian Phillips Curve.” Note that it holds
regardless of the assumed evolution of nominal spending. Let us ﬁrst consider the case of a
random walk with drift in nominal GDP, as in section 3.
The rational expectations equilibrium associated with such a policy is then a pair of
stochastic processes for the price level and real GDP that are consistent with both (4.2) and
∆pt + ∆yt = g + ut: (4.4)
The unique solution in which inﬂation and output ﬂuctuations are stationary is given by
yt = º(yt¡1 + ut);
∆pt = g + (1 ¡ º)(ut + yt¡1);
where 0 < º < 1 is given by
º =
1 + ¯ + · ¡ [(1 + ¯ + ·)2 ¡ 4¯]1=2
2¯
: (4.5)
29We observe that output ﬂuctuations again follow a law of motion of the form (3.8), except
that now the autoregressive coeﬃcient º depends upon the frequency of price adjustment
among other parameters. Thus the impulse responses of both prices and real activity in
response to a monetary disturbance are of the same form as in the noisy-information model.
In fact, for given values of » and ¯; to any value of the variance ratio ¾2
v=¾2
u (or rate of
information ﬂow in the model with noisy information) there corresponds a particular value
of ® (or degree of price stickiness) that results in identical dynamics of prices and output.
Thus in the case that nominal GDP evolves according to (4.4), and we treat both ® and the
variance ratio as free parameters (to be estimated from the dynamics of aggregate output and
the aggregate price index), the predictions of the two models are observationally equivalent.
In the case that ¯ is near one (a plausible assumption), we can go further, and obtain an
equivalence between a particular value of the variance ratio and a particular value of ® that
holds regardless of the value of »: When we set ¯ equal to one, (4.5) reduces to exactly the
same expression for º as in the noisy-information model (one minus the right-hand side of
(2.30)), except that ° is equal to ·. Comparing expression (4.3) for · (and setting ¯ = 1)
with expression (3.7) for °, we see that the value of ® required for the sticky-price model to
imply the same dynamics as the noisy-information model is the one such that
®






In this limiting case, the required value of ® is independent of the value of »: This means
that even if the structure of the economy were to shift in a way that changed the value of »,
the predictions of the two models would continue to be identical.
4.2 Consequences of Persistence in the Growth of Nominal Spend-
ing
However, it would be a mistake to conclude more generally that the noisy-information model
is observationally equivalent to the Calvo model of staggered pricing. The models cease to
predict the same dynamics of output and inﬂation if nominal GDP does not follow a random
walk with drift. This can be seen by considering the more general stochastic process for
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Figure 4: Comparison of impulse response functions predicted by the two models, for the
cases ½ = 0 and .3.
nominal GDP (2.10) considered earlier, in the case that ½ > 0; so that the growth rate of
nominal GDP exhibits serial correlation.14 In this case, we are unable to obtain an analytical
solution to the nonlinear equation system (2.31), and so must resort to numerical solution
for particular assumed parameter values.
Figures 4 and 5 plot the impulse responses of output and inﬂation15 to an innovation
in nominal GDP growth at date zero, that eventually raises (log) nominal GDP by a unit
amount. (The innovation at date zero is thus of size u0 = 1 ¡ ½:) The two rows of Figure 4
consider nominal spending processes characterized by ½ = 0 and ½ = :3 respectively, while
14It is important to note that this is the case of practical interest, given that variations in nominal GDP
growth do exhibit considerable persistence. More to the point, VAR estimates of the eﬀects of monetary
policy shocks indicate an eﬀect on nominal GDP that takes many quarters to reach its eventual magnitude,
rather than an immediate permanent increase of the kind implied by the random-walk speciﬁcation.
15In these ﬁgures, “inﬂation” is deﬁned as 4∆pt; corresponding to an annualized inﬂation rate if the model
“periods” are interpreted as quarters.
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Figure 5: The comparison extended to the cases ½ = :6 and .9.
the two rows of Figure 5 consider the further cases ½ = :6 and ½ = :9: The two columns
of both ﬁgures compare the predictions of two models for each case, the model with Calvo
pricing (the left column) and the model with noisy information (the right column).
In each case, the value of » is ﬁxed at .15, a value that is argued to be realistic for the
U.S. economy in Woodford (2001). The sticky-price model is further calibrated by assuming
¯ = :99; a plausible discount factor if the periods are interpreted as quarters, and ® = 2=3; so
that one-third of all prices are revised each quarter. This implies an average interval between
price changes of 9 months, consistent with the survey evidence of Blinder et al. (1998, Table
4.1). The noisy-information model is then calibrated by assuming that ¾2
v=¾2
u = 6:23; the
value required in order for the predicted inﬂation and output dynamics of the two models to
be identical in the case that ½ = 0:16
16This value diﬀers slightly from the variance ratio of 6 that would be indicated by (4.6), because ¯ is not
exactly equal to one.
32Comparing the two columns, we observe that the predicted impulse responses are the
same for both models when ½ = 0 (as we have shown above analytically), but that they
become progressively more diﬀerent the larger the value assigned to ½: Thus the two models
are not observationally equivalent in the case of an arbitrary monetary policy, and will not
give the same answers to a question about the consequences of changing the way in which
monetary policy is conducted.
Furthermore, the failure of the predictions to agree in the case of substantial persistence
in nominal GDP growth is not one that can be remedied by adjusting the value of ® in the
sticky-price model. The impulse responses predicted by the noisy-information model when
½ > 0 are ones that are not consistent with the Calvo model for any parameter values. This






which implies that the predicted path of inﬂation is a function solely of expected subsequent
output gaps. It follows that a monetary disturbance with a delayed positive eﬀect on output
must increase inﬂation earlier. It is thus not an artifact of the particular parameter values
assumed in Figures 2 and 3 that the inﬂation response is observed to peak sooner than the
output response when ½ > 0: The noisy-information model can instead generate responses
in which inﬂation peaks later, as is especially evident in the case ½ = :9: Such a response is
plainly inconsistent with (4.7).
Further insight into the diﬀerence in the predictions of the two models may be obtained
from Figure 6, which plots the impulse response functions for the price level implied by the
two models alongside the impulse response for nominal GDP. (The case shown corresponds
to the case ½ = :9 in Figure 5.) A monetary disturbance results in a gradual increase in
the log of nominal GDP, to an eventual level that is higher by one than its level before the
shock. The sticky-price model predicts that the average log price of goods will not rise as
much as the increase in nominal GDP, and so real output is temporarily increased. But still,
by comparison with the noisy-information model, the sticky-price model predicts relatively
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Figure 6: Impulse response function for the price level in the sticky-price model (SP) and
the noisy-information model (NI), for the case ½ = :9:
strong price increases in the time immediately following the shock. The reason is that,
under the assumption of full information, suppliers who revise their prices soon after the
shock can already anticipate that further increases in nominal GDP are coming in the next
few quarters. Then, because there is a substantial probability that the supplier’s price will
not be revised again while those increases in aggregate demand, it is desirable to increase the
price immediately in order to prevent it from falling too far behind its desired level before
the next opportunity for revision arises.
In the noisy-information model, instead, there is no such need to “front-load” price
increases in the case of a disturbance that is expected to result in persistent above-average
growth in nominal spending. Suppliers who suspect that such a shock has occurred will
increase prices some, but can plan to increase prices more later if their estimate of demand
conditions has not changed in the meantime. In the absence of a need to “front-load,” initial
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Figure 7: Estimated impulse responses of real GDP and inﬂation to an unexpected interest-
rate reduction. Source: Christiano et al. (2001).
price increases are quite small, owing to uncertainty about whether others are expecting
others ... to expect others to perceive the increase in demand. A few quarters later, instead,
price increases are more rapid than in the sticky-price model. Once suppliers can become
fairly conﬁdent that others expect ... others to have noticed the surge in spending, the
fact that prices were not already increased earlier does not prevent them from being rapidly
brought into line with the current volume of nominal spending. The result is a surge in
inﬂation that occurs after the peak eﬀect on output.
The Calvo pricing model has in fact come under extensive criticism for implying that
the rate of inﬂation should be a purely “forward-looking” variable, and the relative timing
of the output and inﬂation responses predicted by the noisy-information model are, at least
qualitatively, more similar to those indicated by VAR estimates of the eﬀects of monetary
policy shocks. For the estimated responses generally indicate a stronger eﬀect on inﬂation
35in the quarters after the peak eﬀect on output; see, for example, the responses in Figure
7, which are again taken from Christiano et al. (2001).17 The question of how well the
precise quantitative predictions of the noisy-information model match empirical evidence of
this kind is left for future work.18 But the model oﬀers some promise of providing a more
satisfactory explanation than a standard sticky-price model can.
4.3 Responses to Other Disturbances
The noisy-information model oﬀers qualitatively diﬀerent predictions from a sticky-price
model in another respect as well. We have thus far only considered the predictions of the
two models about the eﬀects of a single kind of disturbance, a monetary policy disturbance
that aﬀects the path of nominal spending with no eﬀect upon potential output (the constant
¯ Y above). However, even when the two models predict identical eﬀects of a disturbance of
this kind, they need not predict identical eﬀects for other types of disturbances as well.
In general, they will not, for a simple reason. In the sticky price model, the rate at which
prices adjust following a disturbance depends on the rate at which various suppliers choose
to reconsider their prices; but this rate, if taken as exogenous as in “time-dependent pricing”
models like the Calvo model, will be the same regardless of the type of disturbance to which
the economy must adjust. On the other hand, there is no reason why the rate of ﬂow of
information about diﬀerent disturbances must be the same, in a noisy-information model.
Some variables may be observed with more precision, and others with less; and as a result,
prices may succeed better at bringing about an eﬃcient response to some disturbances than
to others.
A simple example can easily illustrate the way that this can result in predictions diﬀerent
17This observation is related to what Mankiw and Reis (2001) call “the acceleration phenomenon,” though
the evidence that they discuss relates to unconditional correlations between cyclical output and subsequent
inﬂation acceleration, rather than to the co-movements of these variables that are associated with identiﬁed
monetary policy shocks.
18We cannot address the question here, both because the estimated impulse response of nominal GDP
shown in Figure 1 is plainly not consistent with the simple law of motion (2.10) for any value of ½; and because
our theoretical calculations have assumed that nominal GDP is aﬀected only by monetary disturbances, while
the identiﬁed VAR implies otherwise.
36from those of a sticky-price model. Let us again assume a random walk in nominal GDP,
the case in which the two models will (for appropriate parameter values) predict the same
responses to a monetary disturbance ut. But let us now generalize the above model, so that
the log of the natural rate of output (¯ yt) follows a random walk with drift — for example,
as a result of a random walk with drift in a multiplicative technology factor19 — that is
independent of the random walk in nominal GDP resulting from the actions of the central
bank. We can write this process as
¯ yt = ¯ g + ¯ yt¡1 + ¯ ut;
where ¯ g is the average rate of growth in the natural rate, and ¯ ut is a mean-zero i.i.d. distur-
bance, distributed independently of ut:
The optimal price for any price-setter is still given by (2.6), if now yt is interpreted as
output relative to the time-varying natural rate. Similarly, optimal pricing policy in the
sticky-price model continues to be described by (4.1), under the same reinterpretation. It
follows that in the sticky-price model, the relation between inﬂation and the output gap
continues to be described by (4.2). Equation (4.4) continues to hold as well, except that the
right-hand side becomes
(g ¡ ¯ g) + ut ¡ ¯ ut:
Since the composite disturbance ut¡¯ ut is still completely unforecastable at any date prior to
t, the stationary rational expectations equilibrium of the sticky-price model takes the same
form as before, except with g replaced by g¡¯ g and ut replaced by ut ¡ ¯ ut: In particular, the
equilibrium output gap will evolve according to
yt = º(yt¡1 + ut ¡ ¯ ut): (4.8)
The predictions of the noisy-information model will instead depend upon what we assume
about the observability of the additional disturbance process ¯ yt: Suppose, for simplicity, that
19See Woodford (2001) for explicit analysis of how the natural rate of output is aﬀected by technology
shocks, and other real disturbances, in a model of monopolistic competition of the kind used here.
37each supplier observes ¯ yt precisely, while still observing the state of aggregate demand only
with noise. In this case, there is again only a single “hidden” state variable to estimate on
the basis of the noisy observations. In fact, our previous calculations continue to apply, if
we replace pt throughout by ˜ pt; the log of “natural nominal GDP” (i.e., Pt times the natural
rate of output). For ˜ pt satisﬁes the identity ˜ pt+yt = qt; given our reinterpretation of yt; and
the perfect observability of the natural rate means that (2.6) may equivalently be written
˜ pt(i) = ˜ ptjt(i) + »ytjt(i):
With this reinterpretation of the price variable, our derivations go through as before. In
particular, the equilibrium output gap will evolve according to
yt = º(yt¡1 + ut):
For appropriately chosen parameter values, the coeﬃcient º here may take the same value
as in (4.8). But even in that case, there remains an important diﬀerence in the predicted
responses to the technology shock. In the sticky-price model, technology shocks produce
deviations of output from potential that are exactly as long-lasting as those that result from
monetary disturbances. Instead, in the noisy-information model (under our special assump-
tion about the observability of ¯ yt), technology shocks have no eﬀects upon the output gap (or
upon ˜ pt) at all. For while prices adjust only slowly to a change in demand conditions (ow-
ing to the assumed imperfect common knowledge regarding disturbances of this kind), they
adjust immediately to a change in technology (as this is assumed to be common knowledge).
This diﬀering prediction is not just another indication that the two models are not equiv-
alent. It is again potentially of interest as an explanation for one of the more notable embar-
rassments for the sticky-price model. An extensive empirical literature dating back several
decades20 has found that prices respond more, and more rapidly, to increases in the marginal
cost of supply resulting from increases in factor prices than to increases resulting from an
increased scale of production as a result of increases in demand. Such a diﬀerence is not
20See Bils and Chang (1999) for a review of this evidence, as well for further evidence for the same
conclusion.
38easily rationalized in terms of a standard sticky-price model. Some have argued that such
evidence indicates that prices are set on the basis of considerations other than a constant
desired markup over marginal supply cost. The noisy-information model suggests a diﬀerent,
and possibly simpler explanation. Prices are set in proportion to marginal cost, but it must
be the supplier’s subjective estimate of marginal cost; and if suppliers are better informed
about certain disturbances that aﬀect supply cost than about others, those disturbances will
have a larger and more immediate eﬀect on prices.
Of course, I have given no reason why one should assume that suppliers are better in-
formed about variation in the natural rate of output than about variation in aggregate
nominal spending. My point is simply that there is no reason why the logic of the noisy-
information model should imply that the rate of information ﬂow with regard to diﬀerent
shocks must be the same. Even if one supposes that, on grounds of theoretical parsimony,
one should prefer to derive the degree of noise associated with the observation of various
disturbances from a single underlying limitation on human information-processing capacity,
one should not in general expect that the amount of scarce processing capacity allocated to
monitoring diﬀerent types of disturbances should be the same.
This possibility of explaining the diﬀerential responsiveness of prices to diﬀerent types of
disturbances is also an important advantage of the noisy-information model over the model
recently proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2001), that is in some ways similar. Mankiw and
Reis also argue for a pricing model in which each supplier’s price at any given time is optimal
conditional upon that supplier’s information set, and in which price adjustment in response
to a disturbance to aggregate demand is delayed owing to suppliers’ not all having complete
information about the disturbances that have already occurred. But rather than assuming
continuous observation of demand conditions using a noisy channel, as is proposed here,
Mankiw and Reis assume that suppliers obtain no new information at all except at random
intervals. Yet on the occasions upon which a supplier updates its information, it acquires
complete information about all disturbances that have occurred up until that time.21 This
21The Mankiw-Reis model is thus an example of what Sims (2001, sec. 8) calls “information-delay RE”
39is a model in which the relevant cost of information ﬂow is a ﬁxed cost of logging on to the
internet; on the occasions upon which one bears this cost, there is zero additional cost of
downloading all of the available news with inﬁnite precision.
A full comparison of these alternative types of incomplete-information models is beyond
the scope of the present paper.22 But one disadvantage of the Mankiw-Reis approach is
that it suggests that the rate at which suppliers (in aggregate) learn about particular events
should be the same for all events, being determined by the single parameter that indicates
the frequency of information updates. The noisy-information model instead makes it natural
that learning should be more rapid about some events than about others.
5 Conclusions
We have seen that the Phelps-Lucas hypothesis, according to which temporary real eﬀects
of purely nominal disturbances result from imperfect information about the nature of these
disturbances, deserves more continued interest than is often supposed. When one departs
from the assumptions of the Lucas (1972) model in two crucial respects — introducing a
monopolistically-competitive pricing framework in which the optimal pricing decisions of
individual suppliers of goods depend crucially upon the prices that they expect others to
set, and allowing individual suppliers’ subjective perceptions of current conditions to be
contaminated by the noise that inevitably results from ﬁnite information-processing capacity
— it is possible to explain not only real eﬀects of purely nominal disturbances, but real eﬀects
that may persist for a substantial period of time.
We have shown that a model of this kind oﬀers not only a potential explanation for the
kinds of real eﬀects that are usually mentioned as grounds for the assumption of substantial
price stickiness, but also some prospect of an explanation of aspects of price dynamics that are
modelling, as opposed to “signal-extraction RE” modelling, the category to which the present paper would
belong. See Sims for further discussion of the importance of this distinction.
22Their implications are certainly not equivalent. For example, in the case of a random walk in nomi-
nal GDP, the Mankiw-Reis model does not imply inﬂation and output dynamics that are observationally
equivalent to those predicted by the Calvo model, except in the special case that » = 1:
40not easily reconciled with sticky-price models that assume optimization with full information,
subject only to a constraint upon the frequency of price changes. Of course, there is no reason
why the best model might not involve both sticky prices and noisy information — it may be
most realistic to suppose that prices remain ﬁxed for a time, but also that when revised they
are adjusted on the basis of imperfect subjective perceptions of current conditions. But our
preliminary investigation here suggests at least that there is an important cost to abstracting
from the information limitations of price-setters.
While the model proposed here seeks to rehabilitate certain aspects of the explanation
of the real eﬀects of monetary policy advocated by Phelps and Lucas thirty years ago,
acceptance of it would not necessarily lead to all of the conclusions emphasized in the earlier
literature. The Lucas (1972) model was widely argued to imply that there should be little
scope for the use of monetary stabilization policy to oﬀset the ﬂuctuations in output relative
to potential that would otherwise be caused by other disturbances to the economy. For
that model implied that monetary policy could have no eﬀect on real activity that was
systematically correlated with real disturbances unless the central bank were able to observe
and respond to those disturbances, while the private sector could not also observe them and
use them to predict the central bank’s response. Successful monetary stabilization policy
would then be impossible if the central bank’s only information about real disturbances were
also available to the general public.
But the interpretation proposed here of the nature of the relevant information limitations
undermines this conclusion. If suppliers have an inaccurate estimate of current aggregate
conditions not because of the unavailability of good data in the public domain, but because
of paying insuﬃcient attention to the available public-domain data, it is quite possible for the
central bank to aﬀect real activity in ways that are correlated with that public information.
This should greatly increase the plausible scope of monetary stabilization policy. Analysis
of the optimal conduct of policy in the presence of the kind of imperfect common knowledge
described here should accordingly be an important topic for further study.
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